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 Intragroup cooperation, broadly conceived, is pervasive in small group contexts. The 
coordination of effort in task groups, the search for consensus in decision making groups, the 
search for mutually beneficial integrative solutions in negotiations, the give and take between 
leaders and followers, and many other topics considered in this volume involve choices between 
relatively more and less cooperative behavior. But cooperation is the focal concern in research 
on social dilemmas, a class of high interdependence situations which highlight the conflict 
between personal and collective interests. In a social dilemma, the personal rewards for 
competitive (usually termed defecting) choices are higher than for a cooperative choice, 
regardless of what choices others in the group make. In that narrow sense, it is personally 
rational to compete in social dilemmas. However, the collective and personal rewards of 
universal cooperation are higher than those for universal defection. So, if everyone in the group 
makes the “rational,” defecting choice, they’re all worse off than if they made the “irrational,” 
cooperative choice. In a social dilemma, a personally rational choice is collectively irrational. 
These dilemmas arise frequently in social life, in problems of resource conservation (Hardin’s, 
1968, classic tragedy of the commons is a well known example), providing public goods (e.g., 
public radio in the US, which all, including non contributors can use), and economics (e.g., trade 
protectionism as defection vs. open markets as cooperation).  
After several decades of research on prisoner’s dilemma games (PDG; e.g., Pruitt & 
Kimmel, 1977), a simple 2-person social dilemma, social psychological interest in the more 
general N-person prisoner’s dilemma (NPD), or social dilemma, began about 30 years ago, 
stimulated by Dawes’ (1981) and Messick and Brewer’s (1983) influential papers. Since then, 
research interest has grown steadily and rapidly (a PsycINFO search of the phrase “social 
dilemmas” produced 68 references in the 1980s, 162 in the 1990’s, and 1044 after 2000).  
The purpose of this chapter is not to comprehensively review the social dilemma 
literature, an unfeasible task given the vastness of the field. Fortunately, there are a number of 
reviews available (Agrawal, 2002; Bogaert et al., 2008; Komorita & Parks, 1996; Kollock, 1998; 
Kopelman et al., 2002; Kerr & Park, 2001; Ledyard, 1995; Weber et al., 2004). Rather, given this 
volume’s title and objectives, my purpose is to describe some of the groundbreaking work going 
on “at the frontier” of social dilemma inquiry.  This sampling of cutting edge work is admittedly 
selective and idiosyncratic. Moreover, we will not really know for decades which of the frontiers 
now being explored will actually yield the most useful scientific knowledge. So perhaps it is 
more accurate to say that the chapter will focus on four broad topics that strike this observer as 
exciting—1) fuzzy social dilemmas, 2) sanctioning systems, 3) selective play environments and 
partner choice, and 4) subtle determinants of dilemma perception and behavior. Some other 
cutting-edge topics that could have as easily been featured in the chapter (and probably would 
have been, with a different author) will be noted at the end of the chapter. 
Some scholars (Messick & Brewer, 1983; Nemeth, 1972) have suggested that early 
prisoner’s dilemma research lost steam when it became too focused on small experimental 
variations within an already narrow paradigm. One theme that characterizes all of the topics I 
consider here is that they all illustrate a movement away from narrower to broader conceptual, 
paradigmatic, and methodological approaches to the study of social dilemmas. For each topic, I 
will begin by providing some background on the topic, laying out some of the foundational 
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research upon which the newer work at the frontier is based. I will then describe some lines of 
ground-breaking research within the topic.  
Fuzzy Social Dilemmas 
Foundational Research 
 The prototypical prisoners/social dilemma study involves a well specified task or game 
with little or no uncertainty about game parameters (e.g., size of the group, options available to 
players, the interdependencies among players, value of outcomes). In real-world dilemmas, on 
the other hand, there is often much more ambiguity about both the environment and the people 
facing the dilemma—such dilemmas might generically be termed fuzzy dilemmas (Heckathorn, 
1998). The effects of moving from well-specified to fuzzy dilemmas has been an object of 
considerable research attention. 
The most thoroughly studied problem has been the effect of resource/environmental 
uncertainty, usually examined within a resource-dilemma paradigm where cooperation consists 
of taking or harvesting less than one might, and where collective overharvesting can lead to the 
collapse of the resource pool (e.g., if total harvests are greater than the size of the resource pool, 
no one gets anything). Uncertainty is typically manipulated by letting the size of the resource 
pool vary. For example, five persons might be allowed to harvest from a pool of 500 points (no 
environmental uncertainty) vs. one in which the pool could take on any value between 250-750 
points (high uncertainty). In the latter case, the group members have to make their harvest 
decisions before learning the actual size of the pool. The usual finding is that mean harvest sizes 
(i.e., competitive behaviors) increase with environmental uncertainty. The best supported 
explanation for this effect is that optimism about likely environments tends to increase with 
environmental uncertainty (e.g., if the value could range from 250-750, one might assume, 
optimistically, that it will be somewhat greater than the expected value of 500; see several of the 
chapters in Suileman et al., 2004, for a through review of this uncertainty research). 
 More recent work on fuzzy dilemmas has examined the moderating role of environmental 
uncertainty and the effects of other kinds of uncertainty. Particularly interesting in the latter 
regard has been the work by van Lange and his colleagues on negative noise. 
Research at the Frontier 
 Environmental uncertainty as a moderating variable. Not only does environmental 
uncertainty have a direct and negative effect on cooperation, it also seems to moderate the effects 
of a number of other variables. An early example is Wit and Wilke’s (1998) finding that high 
social uncertainty (i.e., the range of likely levels of cooperation by others) undermined 
cooperation only when environmental uncertainty was high. A productive program of research 
by de Kwaadsteniet, van Dijk, and their colleagues has demonstrated several additional such 
moderating effects. The basic idea behind these studies is that even when group members cannot 
communicate, whenever possible they will rely on shared rules to tacitly coordinate their 
harvesting behavior. Under conditions of low environmental uncertainty (i.e., the size of the 
resource pool is fixed or has small variability), that rule is usually an equality rule (i.e., each 
group member will take his/her equal share of the known available pool). However, when 
environmental uncertainty is high, such coordination is more difficult (since it is unclear just 
what an equal share should be). de Kwaadsteniet et al. (2006) show, for example, that personal 
dispositions to cooperate (SVOs) have little effect on harvesting when environmental uncertainty 
is low, with most group members following the equal-harvest rule, but that SVOs show their 
usual effects when uncertainty is high (i.e., prosocials harvest less than proselves). If we have to 
justify our harvests to others, we are even more likely to follow the shared and defensible equal- 
division rule if it is possible to do so (i.e., low environmental uncertainty), but when it is difficult 
to do so (i.e., high environmental uncertainty), the more easily justified course seems to be to 
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simply harvest less (de Kwaadsteniet et al., 2007).  This in turn suggests that uncooperative 
behavior (e.g., taking more than an equal share) can be more easily seen as counternormative 
under conditions of low uncertainty. Thus, the more one takes, the more angry and blaming other 
group members are likely to be. However, under high uncertainty, where large harvests are less 
easily classified as rule violations, group members are less likely to react with anger to larger 
harvests.   
 Other types of uncertainty.  At least four other types of uncertainty have been examined 
in social dilemmas. One arises for step-level public goods, where a minimum total level of 
contributions (the “provision point,” PP) is required to provide a public good. Here, higher 
uncertainty can be achieved via a larger range of possible provision points. Both when group 
members make their contribution decisions simultaneously (Wit & Wilke, 1998) or sequentially 
(Au, 2004) , increasing provision point uncertainty reduced cooperative behavior. A second is 
social uncertainty--the range of likely levels of cooperation by others. Here, contributions to a 
public good tend to be reduced when social uncertainty is high (Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis, 
2002; Wit & Wilke, 1998; although see van Dijk et al., 2009, Exp. 3).  A third type of 
uncertainty is outcome uncertainty, which has been examined via the range of possible values of 
the public good in a step-level game. As long as every possible value was more valuable than the 
provision point—i.e., the average group member never risked a loss as long as the public good 
was obtained—then outcome uncertainty appears to have little or no effect on cooperation (van 
Dijk et al., 1999; McCarter et al., 2010). However, if the outcome uncertainty is great enough 
that actual losses are possible, the resulting loss aversion seems to undermine willingness to 
contribute toward providing the public good (McCarter et al., 2010).   A fourth and final type of 
uncertainty is uncertainty about the size of the group. Here, the effect of group-size uncertainty 
depends on game features—group size uncertainty seems to enhance cooperation in a common 
pool resource (CPR) dilemma (Au & Ngai, 2003; de Kwaadsteneit et al., 2008), but to reduce it 
in a step-level public good game (Au, 2004). These findings highlight the importance of not 
assuming that the relationships observed in one kind of social dilemma will always generalize to 
another—one can get very different results with different dilemmas (see Abele et al., in press).      
Negative Noise. An interesting twist on interacting under conditions of uncertainty is 
provided by the recent program of research undertaken by van Lange and his colleagues on the 
effects of “noise” in social dilemma settings. In these studies, noise is a disconnect between what 
one party does or intends and what the other party experiences. For example, in a relationship, 
one party may intend to act cooperatively (e.g., get home in time for the special dinner the other 
has prepared), but fail to do so for reasons quite independent of his/her intent (e.g., get caught in 
a traffic jam). Van Lange and his colleagues rightly point out that in actual, real-world situations 
of interdependence, such disconnects clearly occur and may even be commonplace. In such 
cases, partners have to interpret whether apparently uncooperative behavior should be attributed 
to the other’s unwillingness/disinclination to cooperate or to other non-dispositional factors (with 
less relevance to the ongoing interaction).  
 Some of the results of this work are unsurprising—e.g., negative noise undermines 
cooperation (relative to interactions that are not saddled with such unidirectional uncertainty; 
e.g., van Lange et al., 2002; Tazelaar et al., 2004). However, the negative effects of negative 
noise are not insurmountable. Several conditions are sufficient to neutralize or mitigate these 
effects. One is the opportunity to communicate (Tazelaar et al., 2004). As many a late spouse has 
discovered, it helps when one can explain that one’s apparently uncooperative act has another, 
more benign explanation. Another is an empathic concern for one’s partner (Rumble et al., in 
press). One is more likely to give one’s partner the “benefit of the doubt” under conditions of 
uncertainty if one is more inclined to look at things from the partner’s perspective.  Finally, it 
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appears that those who are dispositionally more inclined to be cooperative in the first place (e.g., 
those with pro-social social value orientations; e.g., van Lange, 1999), are relatively more 
sensitive to the effects of noise (Brucks & van Lange, 2007). Less cooperative, pro-self 
individuals are not as reactive and retaliatory for occasional uncooperative acts with ambiguous 
causes than those who both are inclined to perform and expect more cooperative behavior. These 
studies have also linked the adverse effects of noise to malignant attributions about one’s partner 
under noisy conditions—e.g., that the partner is less trustworthy (Klapwijk & van Lange, 2009), 
has a non-benign intent (Talezaar et al., 2004), or that the partner simply does not care about 
jointly shared resources (Brucks & van Lange, 2008).    
 Another interesting finding is that the presence/absence of negative noise may moderate 
the effects of other variables. It is widely accepted that a tit-for-tat strategy is a particularly 
effective way to encourage cooperation in other group members (e.g., Alexrod, 1984), but the 
evidence for this has come from the study of “noiseless” environments, i.e., situations in which 
one could safely assume that every apparent act of defection was intentional. However, in a more 
realistic, noisy environment, it seems that relatively more forgiving and generous strategies are 
more effective than strict reciprocity—a smidgen of generosity softens the risks of an “eye for an 
eye” (viz., of getting trapped in a cycle of joint defection) in noisy situations where one may 
inadvertently appear more uncooperative than one really is (Klapwijk & van Lange, 2009, 2010).  
Sanctioning Systems 
Foundational Research 
 In his seminal paper on public goods, Garrett Hardin (1968) despaired of groups’ abilities 
to avoid the tragedy of the commons except via “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon.”  Thus, 
from the beginning, one potentially important structural solution to social dilemmas has been the 
imposition of tangible incentives or punishments outside of the dilemma itself (e.g., mandatory 
taxation to provide public goods; fines for uncooperative behavior). Few early studies included 
any possibility for the imposition of sanctions. A few, more recent studies demonstrated that 
cooperation could be boosted and/or defection deterred by sanctioning systems, whether they 
were imposed by an external agent (e.g., Rapoport & Au, 2001; Wit & Wilke, 1990), by group 
members on one another (e.g., Caldwell, 1976; Eek et al., 2002; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; 
McCusker & Carnevale, 1995;Yamagishi, 1986, 1992), or by a group leader (e.g., van Vugt & 
De Cremer, 1999). More recent work at the frontier has explored a variety of questions stemming 
from this foundational research: Exactly why do such sanctioning systems work?; do they 
sometimes fail or even do harm (i.e., lead to less cooperation)?; can intangible, social sanctions 
be as effective as tangible ones and, if so, which are most effective and why? 
Research at the Frontier 
 Why do sanctions work? The answer to this question would seem to be obvious—
sanctions alter the incentive structure and people will naturally respond. But there are at least two 
routes through which sanctioning systems could work— (1) self-interest/greed makes 
cooperation relatively more personally attractive under sanctioning systems and (2) if one 
presumes that others are similarly affected, one is less fearful of exploitative choices by others 
when sanctions are in place. However there seems to be more to sanctioning than such rational 
recalculations of risks and benefits. For example, Fehr and his colleagues (e.g., Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004a) note that options to punish defectors in their studies are just as popular when 
one can never play again with the defector as when one can. That is, even when it is costly to 
punish and any improvement in the punished player’s future behavior can be of no benefit to the 
punisher, many players still seize a punishment option. In fact, even “third parties” who are not 
playing the game themselves will—although at a somewhat reduced rate—incur costs to punish 
uncooperative parties, especially if the defector is exploitative (i.e., defects when his/her partner 
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cooperates; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b). Both results suggest that the motives for punishing and 
responding to punishment extend beyond enhancing one’s own game payoffs.  
 Another cue to the roots of sanctioning’s effectiveness is that punishing behavior may be 
mediated by moral emotions (e.g., anger; Gächter & Fehr, 1999; de Kwaadsteneit, et al., 2010; 
O’Gorman et al., 2005)—punishment is to some extent the result of anger and also may 
communicate such anger. Still another cue is that the degree of punishment is tied more closely 
to the defector’s relative level of defection (relative to the level of cooperation of the punisher 
and/or the group as a whole) than to his or her absolute level of defection (e.g., Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004b; Masclet et al., 2003), suggesting that punishment is most likely when group 
members are violating group norms. Finally, it is those most inclined to view the social dilemma 
choice as a moral one, those with pro-social orientations (Liebrand et al., 1986), who are most 
sensitive to being sanctioned, particularly with sanctions that emphasize both rewards for 
cooperation and punishments for defection (Folmer & van Lange, 2007).  
 These varied threads of evidence have led several scholars (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2004a; Mulder, 2009) to conclude that when sanctioning systems work, they do so not only 
because of their direct impact on incentives and expectations of others’ behavior, but also 
because they increase group members’ moral concerns. In other words, sanctioning systems 
increase potential defectors’ awareness that certain behavior is counternormative and their 
concerns about not violating local or general (e.g., reciprocity, equal outcomes) social norms, 
and with the social and intrapsychic costs that of violating these norms.   
 When and why do sanctioning systems fail?   There appear to be several ways that 
sanctioning systems can and do fail. One familiar one is via overjustification effects (e.g., Deci 
& Ryan, 1985)—external incentives can sometimes undermine internal attributions for behavior 
(e.g., the intrinsic goal of behaving cooperatively) and hence the willingness to perform this 
behavior absent those incentives. The introduction of sanctioning systems also may suggest to 
group members that others lack sufficient internal motivation to cooperate (e.g., high concern for 
the collective welfare, a disinclination to exploit others). This in turn may undermine one’s trust 
in the cooperativeness of others and, in the absence of the sanctions, one’s own willingness to 
cooperate (Chen et al., 2009; Mulder et al., 2005, 2006). Whereas sanctioning systems can 
increase moral concerns, it is important that they are seen as retributive measures—that the 
sanctioned behaviors are in some sense immoral and that the sanctions exist to punish bad and 
reward good behavior (Mulder, 2009). All else being equal, relatively more severe sanctions are 
more likely to convey this message, particularly if one has some trust in the authorities that 
impose the sanctions and as long as the sanction is not viewed as excessive (Mulder et al., 2009). 
And, all else being equal, punishments are more likely to convey this message than are rewards 
(Mulder, 2008); reward systems are more likely to be used to promote voluntary rules, whereas 
punishment systems tend to be reserved for enforcing obligatory rules. 
 Sanctioning systems also can be seen as compensatory measures—as a means of 
compensating “exploited” parties for the costs incurred as a result of others’ uncooperative 
behavior. When this happens, they can undermine defectors’ moral concerns and hence backfire. 
For example, Gneezy & Rustichini (2000) found that imposing a fine on parents for picking up 
their children late from day care actually increased the incidence of late pickups. Here, the fines 
suggested to parents that they were compensating the day care for their lateness, and this 
perception undermined their sense that late pickups was “bad” behavior (i.e., violated a rule or 
norm; also see Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999).  
The use of social sanctioning systems.  The foregoing research linking sanctioning 
systems to group members’ concerns with the moral implications of their behavior strongly 
suggests that it is not just the tangible costs and rewards inherent in such systems that give them 
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their power. In addition, sanctioning systems can tell group members what behaviors are 
expected and approved of.  If so, sanctioning systems that simply tell group members that others 
disapprove of certain behavior (e.g., defection in a social dilemma) may be sufficient to deter 
that behavior. This has been nicely demonstrated in several studies. For example, Masclet et al. 
(2003) found that giving group members an option to send “disapproval points” (without any 
material consequences) to others was sufficient to increase contributions to a public good, nearly 
as much as an option to send material punishments. Likewise, Carpenter et al. (2004) found that 
cooperation rates were boosted simply by giving group members an option of sending iconic 
unhappy faces to fellow members (for similar findings with other emotional cues of disapproval, 
see Kerr, 2009, and Wubben et al., 2009a, 2009b). Even subtle cues that imply that others might 
be observing, and hence are capable of approving or disapproving, seem sufficient to boost 
cooperation (e.g., Burnham & Hare, 2007; Mifune et al., 2010; Rigdon et al., 2009). For 
example, Kurzban (2001) found that brief eye contact between  male participants prior to 
allocation decisions boosted cooperativeness in a social dilemma.  Even more dramatically, 
Haley and Fessler (2005) found that, relative to a neutral screensaver, a screensaver image 
resembling a pair of eyes boosted contributions in an ultimatum game.  
The psychological processes underlying such effects are not well understood. Some 
researchers (e.g., Hardy & van Vugt, 2006; Mifune et al., 2010) suggest that actual or potential 
evaluation arouses concerns for one’s reputation in the group. Others (e.g., Haley & Fessler, 
2005) suggest that rather automatic, evolved perceptual/judgmental modules are the proximal 
trigger of more cooperative behavior. Still others (e.g., Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Levine & 
Kerr, 2007) suggest that the key motive is to preserve positive relationships within one’s group. 
This latter perspective assumes that group members are very sensitive to cues that suggest that 
they might be excluded and alter their behavior (e.g., conform to implied or familiar behavioral 
norms) to forestall any such exclusion. Consistent with this view, giving group members the 
possibility of excluding or ostracizing fellow group members reliably boosts cooperative 
behavior (Cinyabuguya et al., 2005; Kerr, 1999; Kerr et al., 2009; Masclet, 2003; Ouwerkerk et 
al., 2005; Maier-Rigaud et al., 2010).  
Selective Play Environments and Partner Choice 
Foundational Research 
 The prototypical early prisoner’s/social dilemma study used a forced play paradigm 
where the interdependence structure, behavioral options, and game players were fixed and 
immutable. Besides being an obviously unrealistic model of most real social dilemmas, such a 
paradigm also precluded many interesting and feasible routes to solving dilemmas (see Hayashi 
& Yamagishi, 1998). Simulation and experimental studies of behavior using any of several 
selective play protocols have suggested that it may be easier to achieve higher and more 
sustainable levels of mutual cooperation than previously realized. Such studies have permitted 
greater variability in the range of choices and interpersonal relationships available to the players 
(Gallucci et al., 2004). For example: 
• Some studies have offered players an exit option, permitting them to simply withdraw 
from the game (e.g., Orbell & Dawes, 1993), or to exit and play with a randomly- (e.g., 
Schuessler, 1989) or self-selected (e.g., Hayashi & Yamagishi, 1998) new partner. 
Generally speaking, higher levels of cooperation are achieved with than without such 
options, particularly for players who are inclined to be cooperative, trusting of others, and 
unwilling to remain in an exploitative relationship (see Yamagishi & Hayashi, 1996; 
Hiyashi & Yamagishi, 1998; and Gallucci et al., 2004, for reviews).  
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• A few studies have examined the effect of being able to adjust one’s level of 
interdependence with others—i.e., to seek a relatively more or less interdependent 
relationship. When both players in dyadic games have this option, very high levels of 
mutual cooperation can be achieved (Yamagishi et al., 2005). When one player has the 
option and the other plays a consistent strategy, the option is sensibly used (i.e., the one 
player increases interdependence for highly cooperative others and decreases 
interdependence for highly uncooperative others; van Lange & Visser, 1999). On the 
other hand, when the other player follows a reciprocal (i.e., tit-for-tat) strategy, more 
cooperative players seek higher interdependence, but more competitive players seek 
reduced interdependence (van Lange & Visser, 1999).  
• Still other studies have given players a less restricted set of behavioral options. A nice 
illustration of this type of study is Kurzban et al. (2001, Exp. 1) who found that giving 
players a chance to either increment or decrement posted intended levels of cooperation 
undermined cooperation, relative to a condition where players were only able to increase 
their posted intention If only the lowest intended contribution were posted for all to see, 
this “increase only” option could even prompt steadily increasing cooperation (Kurzban 
et al., 2001, Exp. 2), in line with a minimum reciprocity rule  (Sugden, 1984), which 
prescribes that one cooperates at or slightly above the least cooperative group member.  
More recent research at the frontier has 1) expanded the range and variety of selective-play 
options and 2) begun to explore what besides one’s partner’s known cooperativeness leads one 
(rightly or wrongly) to prefer (or avoid) that person in a social dilemma.   
Research at the Frontier 
 Selective play environments. The foundational work reviewed above has tended to make 
few and narrow departures from a simple forced-choice paradigm and then explore empirically 
what difference they make in behavior. A rather different approach is that of evolutionary game 
theorists (e.g., Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998; Nowak, 2006) who consider many varieties of 
selective play – for example, does it matter if one can withdraw from interaction?; what if 
interaction and/or reproduction is restricted only to some others?; what if such restrictions are 
based on spatial proximity?; what if one’s past behavior establishes a reputation that can guide 
others’ willingness to cooperate or affiliate in the future? This approach tends to be less 
concerned about predicting individual behavior under particular conditions and more concerned 
with the relative rewardingness (and hence, fitness) of alternative behavioral strategies in large 
populations that interact across long periods of time. The primary methods of inquiry are 
simulations and formal theory development.  
 My goal here is not to try to review or even summarize the burgeoning and complex 
literature applying evolutionary game theory to the analysis of human cooperation. Since most of 
the work is done by evolutionary and mathematical biologists, its details are well beyond the 
scope of this chapter (and this author’s competence). I would, though, like to offer a couple of 
illustrations of how such work illuminates our understanding of behavior in social dilemmas.  
We saw above that allowing group members to decline to play or to move to another 
partner generally increased the level of cooperation in social dilemmas. Hauert et al. (2007) went 
well beyond this conclusion by showing that the option to withdraw from the interdependent 
relationship may be vital for the success of punishment as a deterrent to defection. If 
participation in the social dilemma is compulsory, then under reasonable assumptions (e.g., a 
basic social dilemma structure, imitation of successful strategies, some possibility of mutation 
from one strategy to another) defectors will come to dominate the population, even if some 
people are willing to bear the cost of punishing such defectors. But if there is an option of not 
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playing the social dilemma--an option that has a moderate rewardingness--a strategy of 
cooperating plus punishing noncooperators will come to be the dominant strategy. 
 As noted earlier, if all members of a population must play a social dilemma, defection 
evolves and dominates. This remains true when one assumes occasional mutations, resulting in 
offspring that are somewhat more or somewhat less cooperative than their parents. Killingback et 
al. (2006) reported that this situation changes drastically if the population is divided into subsets 
(i.e., groups), the game is played not among everyone in the population but within these 
subgroups only, there is some small but real chance of dispersal (i.e., movement between 
groups). Under these assumptions, group members using strategies that maximize cooperation 
quickly evolve. Others (see Nowak et al., 2010, for an overview) have shown that many other 
variations on this subgrouping or clustering theme have similar effects, whether the clustering is 
based on physical proximity, on social networks, some common phenotype, or as in Killingback 
et al., on simple grouping of the population into subgroups. 
 Analyses like these are beginning to appear in the psychological literature (also see van 
Vugt, in this volume). An excellent example is Kameda et al. (in press), who note that the 
benefits of group collaboration usually show diminishing returns with group size. This is 
contrary to the usual presumption of social dilemmas, whereby the benefits of cooperation 
accumulate linearly with the number of cooperators. In both simulations and a lab experiment, 
Kameda et al. show that if just a few cooperators could produce a big benefit a stable population 
composed of both cooperators and defectors would evolve.Hence, they show how cooperation 
can evolve in groups without any special incentives (e.g., special pride in being a cooperator; a 
valuable reputation for being a cooperator; greater fitness for one’s subgroup relative to other 
subgroups).  
 Choosing partners. One interesting selective-play variation is letting group members 
choose their fellow members. Clearly one would seek social dilemma partners who are 
trustworthy and avoid or abandon partners who are not. This might be determined through actual 
experience with the partner, but mistakes in partner selection could be a rather costly. It would be 
quite useful if there were some means of recognizing trustworthy partners prior to interaction 
using cues that are observable, reliable, and hard-to-fake (such as some aspect of physical 
appearance or an involuntary emotional expression; Frank, 1988). These speculations give rise to 
several related questions: Can people reliably distinguish between more and less cooperative 
partners based on initial encounters?  What cues do they use to make such judgments? What is 
the actual diagnosticity of such cues?  
 An early study by Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993) demonstrated that a 30-min. “get to 
know you” session enabled their participants to estimate others’ subsequent choices in a simple 
prisoner’s dilemma game at a better than chance level. Qualitatively similar results were reported 
by Brown et al. (2003), who showed that opportunities to observe target persons in a variety of 
contexts (e.g., telling a children’s story; describing one’s likes and dislikes) was sufficient for the 
observers to give higher ratings on cooperation-relevant traits (e.g., helpful) to those targets that 
self-identified themselves as more altruistic.  
These early studies suggested that potential partners might well provide cues to their 
future quality as partners, even when they are not actually functioning as partners—we humans 
seem to have some ability to recognize good interaction partners. However, they did not reveal 
just what those cues might be -- they could be any of several nonverbal cues, verbal content cues, 
or some mix of the two. Subsequent studies help narrow the range of possibilities. For example, 
at least some of the diagnostic cues seem to be contained in nonverbal or appearance behavior. 
Shelley et al. (2010; Exp. 2) found that naïve judges whose only information about a group of 
targets was gained through watching a silent videotape of the targets describing the events of the 
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prior day correctly judged that targets with prosocial orientations would use more cooperative 
strategies in making self/other allocations than would targets with proself orientations. 1 To 
narrow the range even further, at least some of the diagnostic cues appear to be available from 
still photographs. 2 Verplaetse et al. (2007) found that naïve judges could, based only on seeing 
still photographs, correctly classify both cooperators and defectors in a PDG at rates significantly 
above chance,. but only if the photos were taken at the moment the targets were actually deciding 
what to do in the PDG ( not in a pre-game neutral photo or a practice round photo; cf. Brown et 
al., 2003, Exp. 2).  Likewise, Shelley et al. (2010, Exp. 3) found no relationship between the 
actual cooperativeness of people (assessed via social value orientations) and judge’s expected 
cooperativeness of those same people when only a still photo with a neutral expression was 
available to judges. These studies suggest that there may be little useful diagnostic information 
available in flat, neutral, or nonexpressive depictions of potential partners. But the story is very 
different when some emotional expression is possible. When judges are shown photos of people 
posing a smile (either with [Exp. 5] or without [Exp. 4] poses of other emotions), they can (to 
some degree, at least) correctly distinguish between more vs. less cooperative people (Shelley et 
al., 2010).  
All this suggests 1) that we rely upon others’ emotional expressions to assess their fitness 
as cooperation partners (the perceptual link) and 2) that at least some aspects of others’ 
emotional expressiveness are reliably linked to their actual or likely level of cooperation (the 
behavioral link). There is growing evidence for both links, particularly when it comes to positive 
emotional expressions.  For the perceptual link, people perceive those who smile, particularly 
those whose smiles are genuine (Duchene smiles), to be more trustworthy and concerned about 
others (Brown et al., 2003, Exp. 3; Krumhuber et al., 2007). People are also more willing to act 
cooperatively towards such smiling partners in games that require trust (Scharlemann et al., 
2001; Krumhuber et al., 2007).  Recall that the most useful cues for partner quality should be 
expressed involuntarily (Frank, 1988), because voluntarily controlled cues are more easily faked 
and could thus be misleading. In their analysis of silent video clips, Brown et al. (2003) found 
that judgments of a target’s concern for others were reliably associated with a number of such 
involuntary cues (e.g., Duchene smiles, brief smiles, a “concern furrow” at the brow), but not 
with several voluntary ones (e.g., eyebrow flashes and raises, open smiles).  
For the behavioral link (between emotional expression and cooperation), there is also 
growing evidence. All the involuntary facial cues that Brown et al.’s (2003) judges relied upon 
were also reliably associated with the targets’ self-reported levels of altruistic behavior.  And the 
frequency of Duchene smiles displayed in an interaction between two friends who had to split 
their experimental earnings was reliably associated with their expressed willingness to extend 
help to others (Mehu et al., 2007). In unpublished studies by Carnevale (1977) and Mills (1978) 
[cited by Shelley et al., 2010], silent videotapes of people describing emotionally charged 
experiences were judged as relatively more positive for more cooperative people and relatively 
more negative (angry and sad) for less cooperative people. All of these studies suggest it may be 
                                                           
1
  It is well established that social value orientations are reliably predictive of cooperative behavior in 
social dilemma and other mixed motive settings (e.g., Balliet et al.,2009). 
2
  A series of studies by Yamagishi et al. (2003) indirectly bolster this argument. When shown pictures of 
former cooperators and defectors in prisoners dilemma games and subsequently asked to identify those 
shown and not shown, participants were better able to recognize former defectors than former 
cooperators. Interestingly, the false alarm rate was also higher for former defectors than cooperators. 
Clearly, there is something in even simple facial images of less cooperative others that makes them 
distinctive and memorable.  
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the general positivity of one’s facial and nonverbal expressions that signals a more cooperative 
person (see Schug et al., 2010, for a competing interpretation). 
Despite the null results reported above for neutral, still pictures, there are also growing 
indications that physical attractiveness might provide a useful cue for partner selection, at least  
for male partners. In an early study, Mulford et al. (1998) found that there was an association 
between how attractive one perceived a potential partner and how willing one was to play a 
prisoner’s dilemma with that partner. These effects were not moderated by the sex of the judge 
or the sex of the potential partner. So people seem to think that attractive partners are cooperative 
partners. Ironically, the actual cooperation data suggest otherwise. Whether attractiveness is 
indexed by subjective judgments by independent judges (Takahashi et al., 2006) or by symmetry 
in body (Zaatari & Trivers, 2007) or face (Sanchez-Pages & Turiegano, 2010), more 
attractive/symmetric men are in fact less cooperative than their less attractive/symmetric 
brothers. And neither attractiveness (Takahashi et al., 2006) nor symmetry (Zaatari & Trivers, 
2007) among females is reliably linked to their willingness to cooperate. This full pattern of 
results has been interpreted in evolutionary terms (e.g., see Zaatari & Trivers, 2007; Takahashi et 
al., 2006)—more genetically desirable (i.e., more attractive, symmetric) males may not be as 
dependent on cooperation to attract mates or to gain other resources (e.g., they can use 
aggression more effectively). This line of argument implicates other potential indicators of male 
reproductive or survival fitness, such as testosterone levels. There are some intriguing hints that 
early exposure to testosterone in utero and resulting observable morphological markers (e.g., 
2D:4D ratio; masculinzed facial features) are linked to cooperativeness, but the findings are 
preliminary and inconsistent (cf. Millet & Dewitte, 2006, 2009; Sanchez-Pages & Turiegano, 
2010; Pound et al., 2009).  
Subtle Determinants of Dilemma Perception and Behavior: Priming/Framing 
Foundational Research 
 The traditional analysis of social dilemmas is an economic, rational-choice, expected-
utility one--people can be expected to respond to the objective payoffs available in the situation, 
or at least to the subjective values that they attach to the possible outcomes. This approach 
suggests that situational features that do not materially alter the dilemma’s incentives should not 
affect behavior choices. Nevertheless, much early social dilemma research showed that framing a 
dilemma with a fixed incentive structure in different ways could alter levels of cooperation. For 
example, framing a problem so that it looks as though a cooperative choice rewards others 
resulted in more cooperation than a functionally identical framing that looks as though a 
defecting choice punishes others (Komorita, 1987; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; cf. Kerr & Kaufman-
Gilliland, 1997). A fairly large literature has examined framing functionally the same dilemma in 
public-good terms (where one must decide how much to give toward a shared resource) vs. 
resource-dilemma terms (where one must decide how much to take from a shared resource). 
More often than not, cooperation rates have been higher in the latter, “take” framing, but there 
are many exceptions and complications to such a simple summary (see DeDreu & McCusker, 
1997; Tenbrunsel & Northcraft, 2010; and Weber et al., 2004, for reviews). 
An appealing alternative to the traditional, rational choice perspective is Weber, 
Koppelman, and Messick’s (2004) appropriateness framework.  The latter suggests that 
behavioral choices are often governed by one’s assessment of just what is the most appropriate 
way to behave in the given situation-- by how one answers the question, “what does a person like 
me do in a situation like this?”. From the appropriateness perspective, apparently superficial 
aspects of the situation—for example, how it is framed or described—can determine how the 
situation is construed and hence what rules or norms one might follow (Tenbrunsel & Northcraft, 
2010). Even the label used to describe a social dilemma can lead to very different construals and 
SOCIAL DILEMMAS  12 
behavior. For example, Batson and Moran (1999) found that characterizing a simple prisoner’s 
dilemma game as a “business transaction” resulted in less cooperation than when it was 
described as a “social exchange”. Similarly, Cronk (2007) showed that giving a trust game an 
extra label (this is an osatua game) that was associated among his participants (Maasii men) with 
need-based giving resulted in giving less and returning less in a trust game than occurred with 
without such a label. Such associations need not be longstanding -- Crock and Wasielewski 
(2008) found that having American undergraduates read a brief description of the Maasii culture 
and the osatua concept led them to exhibit the same framing effects as the Maasii tribesmen who 
grew up with the concept.  
Such findings raise several interesting questions that have gained increasing research 
attention— for example, can such framing effects be primed?; if so, what are the concepts that 
effectively prime higher levels of cooperation?; and when and how do such primes work? 
Research at the Frontier 
 If, as the Weber et al. model suggests, the particular construal one puts on a dilemma 
(“what kind of situation is this and how are people like me supposed to behave in it?”) guides 
one’s behavior, then making a particular construal cognitively accessible—e.g., by priming it—
should guide how one construes the situation. This was demonstrated early on using fairly 
heavy-handed primes by Eliot, Hayward, and Canon (1998). Participants first read a set of news 
briefings that extolled either an entrepreneurial business strategy (i.e., emphasizing autonomy 
and individual achievement) or a cooperative business strategy (i.e., emphasizing teamwork and 
group achievement). They were also asked to provide examples of and arguments in favor of 
their primed strategy. In a second, ostensibly unrelated experiment, Eliot et al. found greater 
cooperation in a public goods game for those primed with the cooperative strategy. Other studies 
have shown that far more subtle primes produce similar effects. For example, Hertel and Fiedler 
(1994) found that priming the positive connotations of cooperation and the negative connotations 
of competition in an ostensive memory test increased cooperation in a social dilemma (also see 
Hertel & Fiedler, 1998; Utz et al., 2005).  Subsequent work has shown similar effects for priming 
or activating business concepts (Kay et al., 2004), interdependence/independence (Utz, 2004b), 
morality (Utz et al., 2005), legality (Callan et al., 2010), and broad/high-level vs. narrow/low-
level construal mind-sets (Sanna et al., 2009).  
 Kay and Ross (2003) provided nice evidence that such priming effects may indeed be 
mediated by group members’ construals of the game. After reading cooperative or competitive 
words in a scrambled sentence task, participants were shown a generic prisoner’s dilemma game 
and asked to rate how appropriate each of several alternative names would be for the game. 
Those primed with competition construed the game as one for which competitive behavior was 
appropriate (e.g., preferred The Wall Street Game as a label) and were themselves less willing to 
be cooperative. Those primed with cooperation construed the game as a more cooperative (e.g., 
preferred The Team Game as a label) and were also more willing to cooperate. The priming 
effects on behavior were also stronger after participants had already named the game (and settled 
on a construal) than when they had not yet done so. 
Recent work has shown that such priming effects in social dilemmas depend upon aspects of the 
person being primed and aspects of the dilemma, and such moderation effects have shed 
considerable light on the underlying psychological processes. For example, priming effects are 
more pronounced when the dilemma itself is more ambiguous and lacks clear normative 
demands (Kay et al., 2004), that is, where the context does not already provide a compelling 
construal. Likewise, priming effects are more pronounced when one does not already have a 
chronically available construal. Smeesters et al. (2009a, Exp. 1) found that people with a strong, 
consistent social value orientation (SVO; regardless of whether it was pro-social or pro-self) 
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were not affected by primes of religiosity (toward more prosocial behavior) or business (toward 
less prosocial behavior) in a dictator game, but those with weaker, inconsistent SVOs were. 
Smeesters et al. (2009a, Exp. 2) also argued that priming the self-concept tends also to prime a 
set of construals of how one usually acts in various situations. In support of this idea, they also 
found less sensitivity to religious or business primes on prosocial behavior among those whose 
self concept had been previously primed.  
 Whether priming a concept will lead to cooperation vs. competition will depend upon the 
preexisting associations the target of the priming has. So, for example, people with pro-social 
orientations think that being smart or competent implies one would act cooperatively (as they 
themselves act), whereas people with pro-self orientations believe that anyone who is smart 
would act competitively (as they tend to act; van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). Thus priming 
competence should tend to increase competitiveness for pro-selfs but increase competitiveness 
for prosocials, which was the pattern Utz, Ouwerkerk, and van Lange (2004) observed. Likewise, 
subtly activating the self (by circling first-person pronouns in a text) led to more cooperation 
among prosocials but to less cooperation among proselves (Utz, 2004a). Likewise, the 
cooperation-inhibiting effect of priming legal concepts was limited to those who already saw the 
world in competitive, zero-sum terms (Callan et al., 2010).  
Most of the priming results we have been reviewing are fairly straightforward—priming 
competition or concepts associated with competition increases competitive behavior. But 
Smeesters, Wheeler, and Kay (2009b) suggested that there is a second interesting route for 
primes—they can color our perception of the other people with whom we may interact. So, for 
example, priming unkindness could both make a person construe the situation as one where 
unkind, proself behavior is appropriate and make the person see his/her interaction partner as 
more unkind. In this example, either kind of priming would be expected to reduce prosocial 
behavior. But, they suggest, which kind of priming is likely to occur depends upon how focused 
the person is on others—being focused outward, on others, would tend to engage the second, 
perceptual route. Smeesters et al. (2009b) present the results of a pair of experiments were nicely 
consistent with this theoretical argument.  
Concluding Thoughts 
The four topics we have been considering are only some of those we might have 
discussed. For example, with but a few exceptions, the first few decades of social dilemma 
research was conducted in western cultures, predominantly the U.S. and western Europe. Today, 
there is increasing interest in discovering more about how culture shapes responses to social 
dilemmas (e.g., Buchan et al., 2009; Yamagishi & Suzuki, 2010). In addition, the growing use of 
biopsycholgical and neuroscience methods to analyze behavior has also been reflected in the 
social dilemma area (e.g., Fehr, 2009; Hein & Singer, 2010). And all the questions that can be 
posed for individual behavior within social dilemmas—and a few that cannot—may also be 
examined when groups rather than individuals are the “players” (e.g., Bornstein, 2003; 
Wildschut & Insko, 2007).  Very interesting work is also being done on the way in which key 
perceptions are formed, such as whether others are trustworthy (e.g., Kramer & Cook, 2004; 
Yamagishi, 2001) or a particular distribution of outcomes is fair (e.g., van Dijk et al., 2010 ). 
And good progress continues to be made in many traditional areas of social dilemma inquiry 
(e.g., social value orientations, Bogaert et al., 2008, van Lange & Joireman, 2010; the efficacy of 
cooperative action, Yu et al., 2009).  
The scientific study of social dilemmas continues to expand and flourish. Most exciting, I 
think, is the truly multidisciplinary nature of this work. If one attends a social dilemma 
conference or simply starts browsing through the literature, one will encounter investigators from 
the natural sciences (e.g., biologists, ethologists, zoologists, ecologists), from the social sciences 
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(e.g., social and organizational psychologists, sociologists, economists, political scientists), and 
from many applied areas (e.g., environmentalists, engineers, conservationists, regulators, policy 
advisors).  Besides this disciplinary diversity one will also see considerable methodological 
diversity. In social psychology, laboratory experiments continue to predominate, but one will 
also encounter simulations, ethnographic studies, field experiments, opinion and resource use 
surveys, archival analyses, observations of natural behavior, and comparisons across cultures and 
species. Such a diversity of conceptual and methodological approaches offers the promise and, 
increasingly, the payoff of converging evidence. The mysteries of human cooperation are not 
fully explored, but if the activity at the frontiers of our knowledge is any indication, we are well 
on the way to understanding the core mysteries--when and why we put common interest ahead of 
self interest.       
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